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PROHIBITION IN AMERICA: 





By Laura Smith 
 
 
Since December 5, 1933, scholars have debated and struggled to determine 
the true results of Prohibition in America. Authors have written countless works 
trying to answer these questions, some hailing, but most criticizing, the 
amendment that transformed American drinking culture. A careful study of the 
topic reveals contradictory statistics, rampant biases, outside factors, and 
generalizations galore that prevent historians from completely uncovering 
Prohibition’s specific results. What can be seen, however, is that the effects 
Prohibition did have were not as negative as historians so long claimed and, 
perhaps even more importantly for this audience, the repercussions of 
Prohibition are no longer present today. 
In the Prohibition debate, one thing is certain: America’s relationship with 
alcohol was getting out of control and had been for a long time. Americans had 
always had a history of drinking hard liquor and often in excessive amounts, 
especially during the last half of the eighteenth and the majority of the 
nineteenth century. Herbert Asbury describes the period in his renowned work, 
The Great Illusion: An Informal History of Prohibition. He writes, “The aged 
and infirm sipped toddies of rum and water—heavy on the rum; babies were 
quieted by copious doses of rum and opium, and so spent their infancy in a 
happy fog; and able-bodied men, and women, too, for that matter, seldom went 
more than a few hours without a drink.”
1
 Daniel Okrent similarly portrays 
America’s drinking history in his work, Last Call: The Rise and Fall of 
Prohibition. He acknowledges that regardless of the reason, the modern drinking 
culture is drastically different from that of earlier America. In the first chapters, 
Okrent gives a synopsis of life in America before Prohibition, emphasizing the 
early dependence on alcohol that had American adults “guzzling, per capita, a 
staggering seven gallons of pure alcohol a year.”
2
 He puts it into perspective by 
equating the amount of alcohol consumed per nineteenth-century individual to 
three times that of the typical American today. 
Even so, a phenomenon soon occurred that would forever change the 
drinking pattern. As poverty and oppression drove millions of immigrants from 
Germany and Ireland to the country, they transformed the make-up and culture 
of society. They introduced the inexpensive beer that changed the look of the 
saloon culture, and heavy displays of public drinking became even more 
acceptable. It was at this point in time that opponents of this rapidly expanding 
                                                          
1 Herbert Asbury, The Great Illusion: An Informal History of Prohibition (Garden City, NY: 
Doubleday, 1950), 4. 
2 Daniel Okrent, Last Call: The Rise and Fall of Prohibition (New York: Scribner, 2010), 8. 




drinking culture organized. These opponents were largely Christian 
organizations and temperance leagues run by women, and it made sense that 
these would be the groups to step forward. In their Drinking in America: A 
History, Mark Edward and James Martin illustrate the climax of the alcohol 
invasion. They ask, “How, for example, could the nation logically promote 
better care for the mentally ill or the imprisoned if it allowed people to drink 
themselves to insanity or to a life of crime?…It seemed impossible to cure 
national ills without acknowledging the centrality of the liquor question.”
3
 To 
the nation’s drys, it seemed the answer to that question was endorsement for the 
passage of the Eighteenth Amendment and the enforcement of a national 
prohibition of alcohol. What ensued would rock the nation and introduce the 
average American imagination then and ever after to the glamorous portrait of 
the speakeasy and the bootlegger. 
In order to judge the success or failure of Prohibition, it must be clear what 
the goals of Prohibition truly were. Many authors have set out to say that the 
ultimate goal of Prohibition was to stop all consumption and distribution of 
alcohol. In this light, Prohibition is almost certainly a failure, as the one thing 
historians agree on is the abundance of speakeasies lining the streets of every 
major city in America. A 1933 newspaper article lamenting the evils of 
Prohibition argued, “For many years, the American took his whiskey at the bar, 
openly and unashamed. For fifteen years, he took what was sold in the 
speakeasies as whiskey, furtively and in fear of thugs and raiders. In either case, 
he has contracted a liking, perhaps a habit, and he will continue to desire his 
whiskey.”
4
 It is hard to know exactly how many speakeasies there actually were, 
and estimates are all over the map. Michael Lerner’s book, Dry Manhattan: 
Prohibition in New York City, attempts to attach a number and struggles. His 
estimates for Manhattan and Brooklyn alone range from roughly 15,000 to more 
than twice that many, but nobody can be sure.
5
 This is a glimpse into one of the 
biggest problems with Prohibition numbers: it is hard to measure what is done in 
secret. If Prohibition had very little chance of putting a complete end to the 
liquor trade in America, perhaps the goal was more about lowering overall 
consumption. 
When looking at consumption, mortality rates due to cirrhosis, records of 
rest homes and mental hospitals, and crime statistics are the general means by 
which scholars can evaluate American drinking habits. These numbers are risky, 
as they are often given without context and can be easily molded into 
ammunition for propagandists. The statistics often lie about the real situation, 
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especially in the case of alcohol consumption, where illegal production of 
alcohol may at times drastically rise while overall alcohol consumption remains 
down over the entire decade. Quantitative historian Jeffery Miron describes the 
problems behind the numbers in his work, The Effect of Alcohol Prohibition on 
Alcohol Consumption. He explains the flaw with conclusions based on cirrhosis 
deaths by arguing that, while the number of them decreased during Prohibition 
and seem to indicate lower levels of consumption, World War I and the 
following flu epidemic killed off a significant number of young men who would 
have contributed most to the cirrhosis death rates had they lived longer.
6
 
Therefore, the decrease in that factor alone is susceptible to much suspicion. 
Even so, in her 1998 work, Domesticating Drink: Women, Men, and 
Alcohol in America, Catherine Murdock adamantly argues that Prohibition was 
at least partially successful on the basis that consumption numbers were down. 
She writes, “Americans in the first years of federal prohibition drank one-third 
to one-half as much as they had a decade earlier…Even later in the decade 
consumption rose to only two-thirds of that in the early 1910s.”
7
 She cites then 
recent research by Clark Warburton to produce these numbers and says that, 
regardless of the amendment’s flaws, a drunken man was rare to see on the 
streets of even most large cities after January 16, 1920. 
Assuming that consumption was at least temporarily lower during 
Prohibition, which even the most biased historian will generally concede, the 
question then becomes whether the amendment or unrelated environmental 
factors caused this decrease. Numerous sources argue that drinking was already 
going down before 1920. As World War I created a need for labor and brought 
change and substantial profit to America, the economy was not the only positive 
change in its wake. In her work, Alcoholism in America: From Reconstruction to 
Prohibition, Sarah Tracy argues that by 1919, a year before the amendment went 
into action, “public drunkards had all but disappeared…The environment—with 
its high employment rates and wartime restrictions on alcohol—appeared to 
slow down the production of chronic drunkards.”
8
 For many Americans of the 
early twentieth century, their argument against Prohibition rested in a general 
belief that the alcohol problem would most likely take care of itself. They had 
seen the power of the Temperance Crusade on decreasing consumption by mere 
suggestion, and many felt coercion would not be necessary. Tracy writes that by 
the time Prohibition was in debate in Washington, “the number of inebriates was 
already dropping—thanks to an expanding labor market—the state reasoned 
with millennial optimism that habitual drunkenness would altogether vanish 
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 Tracy is not the only one suspicious of the claims that Prohibition 
caused the staggering drinking levels to lower from those in the century 
preceding it. As Miron draws his own data to a close, he makes a similar 
realization that the decrease may not be a result of government control. He states 
that, though drinking did decline during the duration of the amendment, “this 
does not prove what alcohol consumption would have been during the 
Prohibition years in the absence of Prohibition.”
10
 
Still other historians believe that even if Prohibition was not the sole reason 
people drank less, it at least changed how they drank, which perhaps was its goal 
in the first place. The provision in the Volstead Act which allowed any alcohol 
hoarded before January 17 for private consumption created two drastically 
separate classes of American society: those who had the money and the space to 
store enough alcohol for a decade of dryness and those who were at the mercy of 
the speakeasy. At least for the first few years of Prohibition, drinking drove 
many Americans home to their private stashes, thus giving the once liquor-
saturated streets the appearance of sobriety. Murdock’s work hinges on this very 
argument, and she states, “Federal prohibition effectively dismantled the public 




The saloon culture of the nineteenth century seemed to many Americans 
something worth killing. Though once perceived as fit settings for the mingling 
of political ideas and fit spots of recreation for both the lower and the upper 
classes, saloons gave way to a very different kind of meeting place produced by 
the Industrial Revolution. Factory life and long hours of drudgery instilled in 
many the desire to find escape, be it through a bottle or through one of the many 
female patrons. Large factories brought numerous young, often unattached men 
looking to spend their weekly wages on drink and riotous living, and, as for 
which came first, the need for alcohol or the surplus of it, the drys seemed in a 
general consensus that neither could survive without the other. In John Marshall 
Barker’s 1905 work, The Saloon Problem and Social Reform, he argued, “The 
supply of liquor creates the demand, and not, as in the case of necessities, the 
demand the supply. In a multitude of ways it fosters and overstimulates a thirst 
for drink.”
12
 Regardless of the public’s opinion on the place of the saloon in 
society, no one could argue against the fact that they were on nearly every street 
corner before Prohibition began. If the disappearance of saloons in major cities 
was the goal, then Prohibition appeared to succeed, though the argument that the 
saloon was replaced by the speakeasy is valid. 
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Understanding the true goal of Prohibition presents its own challenges. Not 
only is the true goal hard to discern, its immediate results are equally difficult to 
sift out. That is in part due to a major event that hurled itself into the public eye 
in the fall of 1929—that is, the stock market crash that ushered in the Great 
Depression. The people of the United States had not seen an economic downturn 
to that extent before, and it seemed to some that the wets had been right all 
along in saying Prohibition was too costly to keep up. Many felt the time had 
finally come for everyone to pay for it. 
However, the economy experienced a period of relative prosperity just after 
the passage of the Eighteenth Amendment. A prominent economist of the time, 
Irving Fisher, had named the illegalization of alcohol an economic success in his 
1927 work, Prohibition at Its Worst. Even without proper enforcement, Fisher 
contended that Prohibition had saved six billion dollars in the last year, seven 
years after its start in 1920. Fisher argued, “If Prohibition enforcement cost us 
even $1,000,000,000 a year, it would be well worth while purely as an economic 
investment.”
13
 Fletcher Dobyns gives a similar defense in his 1940 work, The 
Amazing Story of Repeal: An Exposé of the Power of Propaganda. He claims 
that those who blamed the depression on Prohibition had fallen prey to wet 
propaganda seeking repeal. He writes that they failed to see “that under 
prohibition we had had ten years of unexplained prosperity, that the depression 
was world-wide and due to causes with which prohibition had nothing to do, and 
that it had come earlier and was more severe in countries like England and 
Germany which were not ‘afflicted with prohibition.’”
14
 Looking back, it is 
likely that those arguing that the alcohol abeyance had produced a massive 
economic catastrophe were wrong, but there were other more legitimate 
accusations doubting Prohibition’s immediate results. 
When asked to describe Prohibition, even the most unlearned student of 
history will pepper his or her answer with depictions of gangsters roaming the 
streets of major cities and the black market liquor trade. This is largely because 
these things are known to have existed during the “dry decade,” and few can 
argue that a rise in crime did not occur in the years of Prohibition enforcement 
and lack thereof. This is often the central argument condemning Prohibition as 
an embarrassment of history, as is the case with Edward Behr’s 1996 work, 
Prohibition: Thirteen Years That Changed America. He introduces the book by 
describing the climactic scene in the life of a man named George Remus who 
shot his second wife, Imogene. Behr reveals little else about Remus’s life before 
his violent act, but says only, “Prohibition itself was the real culprit,” bringing 
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with it “irresistible temptations in the wake of unprecedented corruption.”
15
 Behr 
heavily implies that Prohibition provided the opportunity for otherwise good 
men to become entangled in a world of seedy speakeasies and organized crime, 
and perhaps he is right. There is no doubt that the number of homicides did in 
fact rise after the enactment of Prohibition. 
It is important, however, to look at the nature of the homicides and once 
again look behind the numbers. In 2009, Mark Asbridge and Swarna 
Weerasinghe published an article in which they looked at the data on homicides 
involving alcohol and those unrelated slightly before and during Prohibition. 
What they found was that, while non-alcohol-related homicides rose during 
Prohibition, alcohol-related homicides remained steady. They argue, “If the rise 
in total homicides is due to an increase in violent forms of conflict resolution, 
the flat trend in alcohol-related homicides suggests that this increase is not a 
direct product of the illicit production and sale of alcohol.”
16
 Asbridge and 
Weerasinghe further muse that overall homicides may have risen due to a 
general trend towards violence in the twentieth century, and not due to 
Prohibition at all. Dobyns also promoted this notion, declaring, 
 
Every informed person knows that the gangster and the racketeer put in 
their appearance fifty years before the adoption of the Eighteenth 
Amendment, and that crimes of violence increased steadily during that 
period. In the bitter struggle between laborers and employers that began 
in the middle of the last century, the employers hired strikebreakers and 
detectives and sluggers to protect their property, and the laborers 
accepted this method of warfare. The gangsters and racketeers were 
born of this struggle, although they were not exploited and dramatized 




This once again proves how difficult it can be to discern Prohibition’s 
immediate results. However, a possible result of Prohibition not examined 
through questionable statistics is what Prohibition proponents deemed the 
emergence of a more efficient working class. A principle outcry amongst the 
drys against alcohol was that it robbed time and presence of mind, two 
commodities esteemed higher than ever before with the onset of industrialization 
and the values held by those who wanted to move up the economic ladder. 
Lender and Martin comment on the brewing frustration with this wasteful trend, 
saying, “The practice of whiling away hours in saloons, which had been 
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harmless enough in the pre-industrial era, was to be avoided on 
principle…According to the industrialists, wages should be put into savings, 
investments, and manufactured goods.”
18
 
One of the greatest problems a foreman faced was poor attendance of his 
workers. These workers, often the poor, unattached immigrants who had 
frequented the saloon in the days before Prohibition, often failed to show up for 
work the day after. This was a practice the drys promised Prohibition would 
eliminate, and economist Herman Feldman argued that it did. His 1927 work, 
Prohibition: Its Economic and Industrial Aspects, admitted that, while little data 
existed to analyze absences and work accidents related to alcohol, the position 
of the boss was that Prohibition had cleaned up factory efficiency and 
attendance. He wrote, “That industry has lately been suffering a good deal less 
from irregular attendance caused by overindulgence than it did in the past is thus 
the general testimony…There are numerous and emphatic statements, by 




When trying to determine Prohibition’s results, the scholar cannot help but 
face cumbersome questions: why are there so many contradictions, and how do 
so many historians reach drastically different conclusions from the same data? 
Anyone hoping to delve into the murky depths of scholarship on Prohibition is 
soon to discover that, apart from general surveys over the topic and miniscule 
excerpts about it existing in other works, relatively little in-depth scholarship on 
Prohibition actually exists. In fact, the majority of scholars have written about 
the subject during three periods: the time surrounding and within Prohibition’s 
actual enforcement, shortly after 1970, and in the years around the turn of the 
twenty-first century. The interest in writing around the time of Prohibition is 
easy to explain, but the spark of interest around 1970 is almost certainly in direct 
response to another influential event in American history taking place at that 
time. 
The passage of the Controlled Substances Act as a part of the 
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 caused a 
heightened preoccupation in analyzing not just the prohibition of drugs but the 
concept of prohibition in general. The proliferation of Prohibition scholarship 
after the turn of the century is most likely directly related to renewed interest in 
the question of drug legalization around this time. Assuming that highly 
controversial, more current events drove these bursts of scholarship, it should 
come as no surprise that finding an accurate and unbiased account of Prohibition 
data is exceedingly difficult. No historian writing in the time directly 
surrounding Prohibition could completely determine results that would take 
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decades to confirm, and historians writing in tumultuous periods related to 
prohibition of drugs are unable to write without the blinders of this separate 
argument. Books abound that attempt to prove the evils of drug prohibition with 
evidence of Prohibition’s own demise. Jeffery Miron and Jeffery Zwiebel 
introduce their article, “Alcohol Consumption during Prohibition,” with a 
comment about this very phenomenon. They state, “The burgeoning debate over 
drug legalization in the United States has drawn renewed attention to the 
nation’s experience with Prohibition…Prohibition provides a natural setting in 
which to examine the impact of legal restrictions on the use of substances such 
as alcohol or drugs.”
20
 
Regardless of Prohibition’s role as the overlooked salvation of American 
society or as a disruption of man’s inherent right to intemperance, Prohibition 
was repealed. Whether it was repealed based on the insufficiency of positive 
results or by outside factors is another debate, and the arguments are as various 
and sundry as those on Prohibition’s results themselves. In Murdock’s argument 
that Prohibition killed the saloon culture by driving drinking into the home, she 
simultaneously concludes that Prohibition could not last because it did not 
provide Americans with the positive aspects of the saloon that had once existed. 
She writes, “Prohibition failed to produce substitutes for alcohol or the saloon, 
despite warnings that people would continue to crave the companionship these 
afforded.”
21
 Despite the obvious societal taboos woven into the saloon, its 
disappearance may have in fact created a need for a social gathering place for 
those same tired and lonely workers that had once frequented its doors. 
Murdock is not the only one arguing that the saloon’s absence had to be 
filled by something. Feldman’s economic look at Prohibition also commented 
on the changes since the saloon’s departure, though he felt that more wholesome 
industries were thus able to profit in its place. He mused, “Has the abolition of 
the saloon augmented the popular demand for many other goods and services? It 
appears that it has, that in the degree to which the change has been bad for the 
saloon and liquor business, it was good for other trades catering to some of the 
wants which the saloon satisfied.”
22
 He felt that theaters, ballparks, radios, and 
Sunday drives stepped in to fill the void and provided the entertainment the 
saloon once did. 
Regarding reasons for the repeal, factors outside Prohibition’s possibly 
negative immediate results had quite an influence on the decision. Although 
historians can now see that Prohibition did not cause the Great Depression, the 
Great Depression quite possibly brought an end to Prohibition. The stock market 
crash of 1929 ushered in a decade of unemployment and wide scale poverty, 
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and, as this dragged on, people were less and less able to justify progressive 
expenses aimed at improving the morality of a society that was struggling to 
survive. Bread was worth more than temperance. As Lender and Martin explain, 
“The battle over liquor paled before the monumental social problems resulting 
from the depression. Just as an earlier generation of Americans had set aside the 
dry crusade with the coming of the Civil War, so their twentieth-century 
counterparts turned away from antiliquor agitation to tackle the awesome task of 
national economic recovery.”
23
 As time passed, it also became harder to ignore 
the amount of jobs that repeal would provide in breweries, bottling companies, 
and bars. An example of that hope is evident in a New York Times article in 
March of 1933, only months before the force for repeal finally triumphed. The 
article claimed that while people expected many businesses to profit from the 
legalization of alcohol, the only industries they expected to lose money were the 
soft drink companies and, therefore, the sugar industry.
24
 Still, many hoped that 
the repeal of Prohibition would give the nation’s sputtering economy enough of 
a kick start to propel it out of the depression. As they would soon see, the path to 
recovery would be as complicated as the depression’s causes. 
Another reason for Prohibition’s repeal was the serious lack of funding 
provided for enforcement even from the start. Few seemed to realize the expense 
attached to the enforcement of such laws at the time of their passage, something 
Asbury comments on in his work. He contradicts Fisher’s earlier argument that 
Prohibition had saved money. Asbury instead argues, “Enforcement would cost 
at least three hundred million dollars a year. It was obvious that no such sum 
would ever be provided, and it was equally obvious that the states would do 
little or nothing.”
25
 He seems to place the failure of Prohibition not on an 
increase of alcohol-related crime but on uncooperative state legislatures that, 
even before the depression when the money was available, felt little need to fund 
enforcement on a local level. Total prohibition of alcohol, in order to succeed, 
would have required a level of support it never had. 
When the Eighteenth Amendment passed, Prohibition was at a climax of 
popularity that it could not maintain. Its subsequent failure was not necessarily 
because of any evil the amendment produced but rather the indifference that 
followed its initial success. Once the drys had their legal day, many acted as if 
their job was done, but laws alone could not change a nation. Behr comments, 
“Perhaps the least-learned lesson of Prohibition is that legislation alone is no 
answer to America’s problems. The moralists and evangelical pioneers without 
whom Prohibition would have remained a dead letter believed that enactment of 
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the Eighteenth Amendment would be sufficient to change the habits of 
American society as a whole. They were quickly proved disastrously wrong.”
26
 
It became clearer why Prohibition consequences are difficult to delineate, 
and why a close study reveals very few discernible results at all. Prohibition may 
have done many things to lower consumption or it may have even raised crime. 
The multiplicity of outside factors acting during the decade and affecting its 
repeal strongly suggest that Prohibition did not cause the negative aftermath 
many projected before it began or argued it had after its end. Testifying to this 
are the two interesting occurrences on January 16, 1920 and December 5, 1933. 
In the final weeks before enforcement of the Eighteenth Amendment began, the 
papers abounded with projections of a nation-wide binge that would take place 
in the final hours before the Volstead Act’s enforcement. What actually 
transpired on that night, however, was very different. Behr describes it, saying, 
“Surprisingly, though a phenomenal amount of drinking took place all over 
America on the night of January 16, the occasion failed to live up to reporters’ 
(and saloon keepers’) expectations.”
27
 In his own survey of Prohibition, The 
Long Thirst: Prohibition in America, 1920-33, Thomas Coffey also mentions, 
“Throughout the country it was a surprisingly sober night. The national binge 
which was widely expected did not take place. Even New York, a city 
prohibitionists considered the modern-day Gomorrah, was relatively sedate 
during the last hours of legal liquor on January 16, 1920.”
28
 Some argue that the 
only reason the binge did not take place was that so many had already stored up 
enough alcohol in their homes to keep them out of the streets, but that does not 
explain the similar lack of celebration at Prohibition’s end on December 5, 1933. 
Once again, journalists scoured the streets looking for phenomenal excess, 
and, once again, they found none. They had expected bar brawls and drunken 
celebrations spilling out into the streets, but Coffey comments that major cities 
like Boston and Philadelphia were quiet the night that Utah became the last state 
to ratify. Even in New York, where many had expected celebrations to rapidly 
escalate, the New York Times reported that “with the city’s entire police force of 
19,000 men mobilized to guard against overexuberant celebrants, arrests did not 
exceed the normal number for any day of the last five years.”
29
 A reporter on the 
celebrations in Times Square said, “The crowds were orderly and mildly amused 
at the photographers’ flashlights and the trucks unloading spirits, but they were 
only slightly larger than on a good Saturday night, and the 200 extra policemen 
assigned to the district had little to do.”
30
 This lack of activity suggests that 
Prohibition came and went with little impact. The hardened drinkers were 
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determined to drink regardless of the law, and much of society chose to abstain 
with or without enforcement. The only far-reaching result of Prohibition was a 
change in the national perception of public drinking and general consumption. 
However, it was probably not a direct result of Prohibition so much as the 
temperance sentiment brought about by the Temperance Crusade long before 
January 16, 1920. Furthermore that sentiment continued to have impact 
sometime after December 5, 1933. 
This is the position that Pamela Pennock and K. Austin Kerr take in their 
article, “In the Shadow of Prohibition: Domestic American Alcohol Policy since 
1933.” They see Prohibition as largely defective both in enforcement and in 
stimulating a crime wave that introduced the average, middle class citizen to 
lawless bootlegging, but they see the temperance sentiment that started it all as 
having a lasting impact on America’s relationship with alcohol. They argue that 
even once the nation repealed the Eighteenth Amendment, “the consumption 
level of alcoholic beverages remained a disappointment to their suppliers and 
tax collectors…Drinking had increased by the end of the 1930s, but remained 
largely flat thereafter, partly as a result of the ageing of the population, but also 
because of enduring values of temperance.”
31
 Even this result, however, does 
not extend to today, and by the 1970s, Pennock and Kerr note that Americans 
returned to drinking as much as they had before Prohibition ever took place. 
Herbert Asbury, the writer of what was probably the most in-depth and 
earliest account of those thirteen sober years, concluded The Great Illusion with 
an interesting final thought on what Herbert Hoover deemed “the noble 
experiment.” Asbury writes, “Well, of course, there are now no ‘saloons’ in the 
United States. Instead there are bars, taverns, grills, and cocktail lounges. But by 
and large it is the same old rose with the same old smell.”
32
 He was right. A 
thorough study shows that the results many once blamed on the amendment, 
including increased consumption, economic downturn, and high crime, were not 
results of Prohibition at all but of outside factors. While it had temporarily 
lowered consumption and proved efficient to an extent, Prohibition had changed 
next to nothing permanently. 
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